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The Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment (CeBRA) performs interdisciplinary research on
ethics, risk issues and other societal aspects regarding the performance and results of biological sciences.
Researchers with their background in social sciences and the humanities as well as in natural and applied
sciences are involved in CeBRA’s projects. CeBRA is jointly owned by the Danish Institute of Agricultural
Sciences, Risoe National Laboratory, the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University and the University
of Copenhagen. Its project grants come mostly from Danish and European public funds and some also
from industry.
In 2001 the Danish Parliament launched the BioTIK project. It was a four-year project focusing on both
the possibilities that gene technology offers, and the ethical principles that are to be considered in order
to make the right decisions. BioTIK is a Danish abbreviation of biotechnology and ethics. Hence nine
Danish ministries joined a Task Force with the purpose to incorporate ethical principles in regulation of
biotechnology, in decision making processes and as a basis for public debate and information.
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3FOREWORD
Transparency is a highly desirable feature of the recommendations and decisions made by public autho-
rities on the use of chemicals, GMOs and other potentially hazardous products. Without it, the relevant
political decisions may not be perceived as legitimate.
But it is no simple task to make the complicated technical basis of such decisions transparent to the rest
of society. And when decisions involve political considerations it can be hard to clarify the criteria of poli-
tical acceptability.
These difficulties notwithstanding, we believe that we have taken some important steps forward in the
project “The Hidden Values - Transparency in Decision-Making Processes Dealing with Hazardous
Activities”. The report seeks to shed light on what is needed to create a transparent framework for political
and administrative decisions on the use of GMOs and chemical products.
It is our hope that the report’s recommendations will serve as a source of guidance to public authorities,
politicians and others interested in increasing the transparency of decisions on GMOs, chemicals and
other hazardous activities.
Peter H. Schaarup Peter Sandøe
Special Adviser, Secretariat of BioTIK, Director, Danish Centre for Bioethics
Danish Consumer Agency and Risk Assessment
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Table 1. Summing up – key recommendations to improve transparency
Lack of transparency in decision-making proces-
ses is often pointed to as an explanation of the evo-
lution of controversies concerning risk. The aim of
this report is to discuss the normative and factual
premises in risk decisions with the purpose of wor-
king out recommendations on how to make these
premises more transparent for third parties. 
It is generally agreed that the risk analysis pro-
cess contains three interacting elements: risk
assessment, risk management and risk communi-
cation. Effective risk communication is a precon-
dition of transparency, but from our point of view
a prerequisite for transparency in risk communi-
cation is transparency in the two other elements of
risk analysis, especially where the normative and
factual premises are concerned. Therefore, we
have chosen to address transparency in risk
assessment and risk management. We shall put
less emphasis on transparency in risk communica-
tion.   
This report contains theoretical parts concer-
ning value premises, uncertainties and knowledge
application in risk decisions which are supported
by experiences from empirical studies and a
workshop held on 7 December 2004. The theoreti-
cal parts are intended to explain the underlying
rationale for our recommendations  
The outcome of the project is a list of recom-
mendations on how to improve transparency in
risk assessment and risk management. It is our
expectation that improved transparency in risk
assessment and risk management will lead to
improved transparency in risk decisions and risk
communication. 
Table 1 contains the key recommendations of
the project.
7
GUIDANCE AND MAIN RESULTS
The normative premises constituting the ‘risk window’ related to risk assessment, together with acceptance criteria, should be
addressed through dialogue between policy-makers and risk assessors in order to achieve common understanding of the man-
date for the risk assessment. We recommend the following points:
• which kind of decision is to be taken, and hence
• which form of conclusion is needed
• legal foundation
• concerns behind the question, e.g. suspected hazards etc.
• the criteria considered relevant
• levels for acceptable risk (if possible)
• expectations concerning the scope of the risk assessment
• explicit limitations
• attitudes concerning uncertainties
The specific value premises of an approval of a risky activity are presented by stating the identified hazards and their investiga-
ted adverse effects. 
• risk characterisations for each adverse effect
• presentation of, and argumentation about, those hazards and adverse effects considered but ignored
An audit trail of the appraisal process should be made available to policy-makers, decision-makers, and ultimately stakeholders.
The audit trail might cover the mandate; the generation of scientific questions; the scientific arguments; alternative scientific
options and uncertainties; and the scientific appraisal of policy options.
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8Uncertainties are presented for each adverse effect to indicate alternative scenarios to the most likely risk characterisation toget-
her with an evaluation of the reliability of each of the alternative scenarios.
• the approval is supplemented by a statement explaining whether the precautionary principle has been applied in the light of
identified uncertainties
Common understanding can be improved by face-to-face meeting between scientific advisers and policy-makers in all steps in
the appraisal process, with special emphasis on the distinction between analysing scientific and normative premises; and the out-
come of these meetings should be documented in an audit trail. Further, it is recommended that times and places for dialogue and
participation (e.g. fairs, talk rooms, public meetings, conferences) be established.
Establishment of a well-documented process for identification and selection of scientific advisers, stakeholders (hearing part-
ners) and expert committees.
It should be made clear both how the hearing statements will be used in the appraisal procedure and which topics will be com-
mented on. Afterwards feedback indicating the impact of the hearing statements in the approval process should be returned to
hearing partners.
Worries among stakeholders, including ethical worries, that are not addressed by the appraisal procedure should be pointed out,
together with advice on where and how these worries can be discussed and treated.  
Regular exchange of experience between the jurisdictions responsible for the regulation of risky activities can be constructive
in order to help make the scientific advisory structure transparent.
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Decision-making processes dealing with hazar-
dous activities are a challenge to modern society.
The risk debate has shown how a wide range of dis-
parate issues, such as socio-economic impacts,
ethical questions, utility value, and uncertainties,
worries the public. Today the situation in Europe
on risk issues can be characterised as government
decisions on hazardous activities based on tech-
nocratic and scientific assessments often regarded
as too narrow and not in compliance with the
viewpoints of the public at large. Authorities and
their scientific advisers are increasingly faced with
the demand that approval decisions made on the
basis of risk assessments should be more transpa-
rent. The main reason behind this demand is the
apparently decreasing confidence among the gen-
eral public – a decrease fuelled by controversial
cases such as genetically modified crops and mad
cow disease.
Loss of confidence is supposed to arise when
science-based reassurances are proven wrong. It is
reinforced when mistakes are not openly admitted
or perhaps covered up. Another cause of loss of
confidence is the experience among the general
public that important worries are not being
addressed, or that lay people are not being listened
to, by the approval procedures.
Handling risks in a fashion that coheres with
societal views and needs is one of the most chal-
lenging aspects of the risk management process. It
involves considering not only the possible conse-
quences of risk-taking and their likelihood, but
also the respective merits and limits of the various
options for risk reduction, how costs and benefits
would be distributed among individuals, whether
social values might be contradicted, and the state
of knowledge and variety of standpoints regarding
all these issues. This situation calls for discussions
on how to perform decision-making in an open
and transparent way that reflects social concerns,
and it represents a challenge of great magnitude
for modern society and democracy.  
The demand for transparency is believed to be
a first step on the way to regain confidence in the
regulation of hazardous activities and the risk
assessments it is based upon. The aim is to increa-
se knowledge of the decision procedures and their
foundation. This increased knowledge is a precon-
dition of sceptical members of the general public
being able to exert influence on the political frame
underlying decision procedures. Eventually, this
might in the longer run then provide the basis for
an informed and focused debate, and also ensure
that decision procedures evolve so as to better
meet the expectations of the general public. Raised
transparency in the risk assessment process can
also have the additional benefit of achieving more
reliable final statements of risk, because transpa-
rency can help to ensure that relevant input is pro-
vided in the right steps of the assessment process.
A frequently mentioned implication of transpa-
rency is the functional separation between risk
assessment and risk management, and more gene-
rally the demand for independent scientific advi-
ce. However, even though independence may
reduce perceptions of vested interests in risk
assessments, it cannot by itself renew confidence
in the credibility of risk assessments. 
First, since decisions are based on risk assess-
ments, emphasising the independent scientific
nature of risk assessments tends to signal, mislea-
dingly, that decisions are made exclusively on sci-
entific grounds. In fact, decisions are action-gui-
ding, and as such they build on a normative foun-
dation identifying adverse effects and the accepta-
ble level of risk for the occurrence of these adverse
effects. Indeed, since risk assessments are suppo-
sed to estimate the likely adverse effects of expo-
sure to a given hazard, they presuppose this nor-
mative foundation in order to be meaningful. 
Therefore, signalling that decisions are made
exclusively on purely scientific grounds will obscu-
re the normative foundation of the decision.
Transparency must, on the contrary, allow the nor-
mative foundation of the decision – and consequ-
ently, the intimate interplay between facts and
values in it – to be brought forward and presented
clearly to the public.  
Secondly, a large part of the loss of confidence
in risk assessments arises from the fact that such
BACKGROUND
9
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assessments seldom present their own limitations
and uncertainties. Thus they give an appearance of
being more comprehensive and certain than they
actually are. The general public tends not to have
full confidence in risk assessments because they
see that, over recent years, a number of uncondi-
tional reassurances about complete safety have
later been proven wrong by the facts. Hence, it will
in general not be perceived as credible if a risk
assessment pretends to guarantee absolute safety
or absolute certainty about its conclusions –
regardless of the evidence these conclusions are
based upon.
The demand for transparency thus makes it
necessary that the normative and factual premises
of a decision are presented in a clear way. Particu-
lar focus should be on the normative foundation of
the decision and how it interacts with the risk
assessment. A special challenge is to present the
uncertainty inherent in the decision and the attitu-
de to this uncertainty taken in the decision – e.g.
whether or not the Precautionary Principle has
been invoked. 
Transparency in this sense demands new
efforts from the policy-makers and the scientific
experts who establish the input of a decision. The
aim of this report is to make suggestions as to how
increased transparency can be obtained at all sta-
ges of a generic decision on a hazardous activity,
product or process.
We should like to point out that, although
transparency has become almost a buzz word, it
might in practice be met with resistance. Transpa-
rency makes policy-makers and scientific advisers
open to public scrutiny and thus vulnerable to cri-
ticism, and they might want to avoid this. Also,
transparency is likely to make it clear for the public
that decisions are based on a more limited and
uncertain foundation than the present appearance
indicates. Policy-makers might fear that, rather
than increasing trustworthiness, this might actual-
ly create more concern among the public. 
In addition, transparency makes the authoriti-
es’ and experts’ responsibility as decision-makers
much more visible. Once again, this makes policy-
makers and their scientific advisers open to criti-
cism, and they might want to avoid this. Finally,
transparency is likely to leave less room for politi-
cal discretion, and politicians might not want that.
We shall try to keep these opposing interests to
transparency in mind in the following.
Our paradigmatic case is decisions about gen-
etically modified organisms (GMOs). However, we
shall consider other cases as well, even though
they might involve other kinds of decision. The
report refers to a European context and it uses
examples from this context. However, we hope the
discussion is sufficiently general to be of interest
for other contexts as well.
10
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We define transparent decision-making as deci-
sion-making in which the decision-maker clearly
presents to others the normative and factual pre-
mises behind his conclusions and explains the
reasoning leading him from these premises to the
conclusion. Transparency thus involves uncove-
ring, describing, documenting and communica-
ting all the argumentative steps in the line of
reasoning and the weighting of evidence leading to
and justifying the final decision. Doing this pro-
perly also means taking into account limitations,
weaknesses and uncertainties, as well as pointing
at issues which – even though they might be consi-
dered relevant from the perspective of some stake-
holders – are not addressed by the decision pro-
cess. 
Our main suggestion is that each decision
should be accompanied by a paper (audit trail)
describing the premises justifying it. Transparency
in this sense demands new efforts from the autho-
rities and the scientific advisers who establish the
input of a decision. Consequently, it will be neces-
sary to investigate the stages of the generic deci-
sion procedure in order to clarify how the different
actors at each stage can contribute to better trans-
parency during the procedure leading up to the
final decision.
Transparency is often identified with openness
in the sense that meetings are public and all rele-
vant documents are accessible to the general
public. However, even though openness is impor-
tant – it must indeed be considered a precondition
for transparency – it is not by itself sufficient.
Transparency also requires the basis of the deci-
sion to be made explicable and understandable for
third parties. In our view, this is achieved by pre-
senting the normative and factual premises
behind the decision and by explaining how the
decision follows as a practical conclusion from
these premises. Hence, we shall concentrate, in
our discussion of transparency, on the content of
decisions and its context, rather than on openness
and other circumstances surrounding the deci-
sion-making process.
Transparency is also often defined as a partici-
patory process involving the public or stakehol-
ders. However, we see no necessary logical con-
nection between the concept of transparency as
defined above and participation. A transparent
decision may or may not involve participation of
the general public or stakeholders. Therefore, we
prefer to keep the issue of participation distinct
from the discussion of transparency as such. But of
course we shall consider the role of participation
in generic decisions about hazardous activities,
products or processes. 
Further, variations in risk terminology have
been identified as a barrier for transparency. From
our point of view, variations in risk terminology are
important for the understanding and manage-
ment of risk issues, as they can be a source of con-
fusion. Thus, we strongly support the ongoing
attempts to harmonise terminology (European
Commission, 2000) and we shall ourselves use this
terminology.
Thus, achieving and improving transparency
must involve:
• Normative premises addressed by the approval
procedure and the argumentation behind
them.
• Mandate and criteria for the risk assessment,
i.e. a specification of unintended events and
adverse effects displaying the risks addressed by
experts in a specific risk assessment.
• Factual premises and argumentation compri-
sing knowledge with related uncertainties gen-
erated for the preparation of the risk assess-
ment. 
• Openness and communication with third parti-
es requiring channels and forums for spreading
and discussion of the material.
• These four interacting dimensions in transpa-
rency concerning risk decisions are illustrated
in Figure 1.
TRANSPARENCY
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Figure 1. Dimensions in transparency
and risk decisions
Mandate 
Criteria
Openness
Communication
Knowledge
Uncertainties
Unidentified
events 
Adverse effects
CBR Rapport Hidden values indhold  17/05/05  11:33  Side 12
13
In this report, a generic decision on a hazardous
activity, product or process, is concerned with
whether or not the activity, product or process in
question should be allowed or disallowed; and in
the former case, whether or not risk reducing mea-
sures should be imposed.
A generic decision has its warrant in the legisla-
tion. Usually it is made by an EU authority; howe-
ver, national authorities or governments may be
involved in the decision process. The decision will
be based on a risk assessment. Hence, it can be
viewed as a form of risk management decision. 
If we look at the kinds of decision that are the
main subject of this investigation, we observe that
they are decisions made by the authorities about
approval (sometimes conditional) or disapproval
of hazardous activities, processes or products.
Thus, the conclusion of the practical argument we
are about to reconstruct is either the statement
that the activity, process or product in question
should be approved of, possibly on condition of
certain risk management requirements, or the sta-
tement that the activity, process or product should
be disallowed.
Basically, it takes two premises to justify a
conclusion like this. One is a normative premise to
the effect that activities, processes or products
involving a risk to human health or the environ-
ment above an acceptable level only should be
allowed if suitable risk management interventions
can be imposed to reduce the risk to an acceptable
level; otherwise they should not be allowed. The
other premise is a factual premise stating whether
or not the risk to human health or the environ-
ment of the activity, process or product in question
is above or below the acceptable level.
A decision on a normative premise of the first
kind is a political decision. The second, factual
premise stems from the conclusion of a risk
assessment performed by independent scientists.
Finally the competent authorities draw the conc-
lusion that follows from these premises. 
Thus, the simple logic of a decision of approval
looks like this:
• Value premise: Activities, processes or products
should be allowed only if they involve a risk for
human health or the environment lower than
the acceptable level; they should be disallowed
if they involve a risk for human health or the
environment higher than the acceptable level.
• Factual premise: This activity, process or pro-
duct involves a risk for human health or the
environment that is lower than the acceptable
level (higher than the acceptable level).
• Approval decision: This activity, process or pro-
duct should be allowed (should either be ban-
ned or be allowed on condition of risk manage-
ment interventions that reduces the risk to an
acceptable level).
The division of labour suggested by the argument
is important from the point of view of democratic
legitimacy. Political decisions should be open to
democratic control. Hence, they should only be
made by people appointed to a political responsi-
bility. In principle, scientific advisers should provi-
de exclusively factual input to the decision, but in
practice they interpret and apply the value premi-
ses during the preparation of scientific advice. The
scientific advisers as well as the policy-makers
should be aware of this two-sided input from sci-
entific advisers. Presenting the premises of a deci-
sion in a transparent manner is a way of making it
open to public scrutiny.
OVERALL VALUE PREMISES IN RISK DECISIONS
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Complexity and transparency in regulatory apprai-
sal may be regarded as being in tension. It can be a
big challenge for a policy-maker to present, to
third parties, a complex problem and decision
situation in an easy and understandable way.
Policy-makers and decision-makers have to face
and be aware of the fact that the complex charac-
ter of risk issues is an underlying, key reason why
risk decisions are hard to present and understand
and consequently are often criticised for lack of
transparency.
There are many senses of complexity which
have to be sorted out in order to make the risk
assessment more transparent. Focusing on trans-
parency in the approval decision, we choose the
line of attack proposed by van Asselt (2000). This
says that complex decision-making is characteri-
sed by:
• multi-problem: there is not one problem, but a
tangled web of related problems
• multi-disciplinary/multi-sectoral: the issue lies
across or at the intersection of many discipli-
nes and sectors 
• multi-scale: the underlying processes interac-
ting on various scale levels (local, regional,
national, continental and global) and on diffe-
rent temporal scales 
Due to the multidimensional character of complex
decisions, transparency is complicated for two
major reasons. First, decision-making on complex
issues implies consideration of an increasing vari-
ety of often conflicting and contradictory perspec-
tives, interests and needs. Second, complexity goes
hand in glove with fundamental uncertainty. The
complexity of the decision situation is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Uncertainty in science and decisions has led to
much confusion among the public. A better
understanding and description of uncertainty and
how it is dealt with in approval decisions is a pre-
requisite for transparent decision processes. Van
Asselt (2000) proposes a taxonomy of uncertainty
that distinguishes between source and type of
uncertainty. 
Source refers to the origin of uncertainty, which
implies that such a classification is preferably uni-
versally valid. On the highest level of aggregation
sources of uncertainty have both an ontological
(variability) and an epistemological (lack of know-
ledge) dimension.
Type refers to the way in which uncertainty
manifests itself in a particular context. The conse-
quence is that any typology of types of uncertainty
is by definition context-dependent or method-
dependent. Uncertainty enters various steps of the
modelling process. This can be described by the
following classification:
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Multi
problem
Multi
dimensional
Uncertainties Controversies
Multi
scale
Complexity
Figure 2. Complex decision problem
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• Technical uncertainties arising from the quality
or appropriateness of the data used to describe
the system. 
• Methodological uncertainties arising due to
lack of knowledge.
• Epistemological uncertainties concern the con-
cept of the phenomenon. This type of uncer-
tainty arises from structural uncertainty and
variability.
Another typology of uncertainty relevant in the
context of science for decision-support is a classi-
fication of uncertainty by its focus in the decision-
making process:
• Action uncertainty, a decision-maker may be
uncertain with respect to the composition of
the set of alternative options.
• Yield uncertainty due to uncertainty with
respect the costs and benefits of the alternative
options.
• Goal uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty or ambiguity
about the preferences or goals the decision-
maker aims to satisfy.
• Political uncertainty due to many conflicting
objectives, priorities and interests.
Uncertainties in the modeller’s and decision-
makers view are illustrated in Figure 3. Model and
monitoring uncertainties are usually dominant in
the ignition and agenda-setting phase. Action and
yield uncertainties may play a vital role in the
assessment phase, while political uncertainties
dominate the actual decision-making process.   
Figure 3. Uncertainty in the modeller’s and decision-makers view (van Asselt, 2000)
Uncertainty in
model quantities
(technical uncertainties)
Uncertainty about model
form (methodological
uncertainties)
Uncertainty about model
completeness
(epistemological un-
certainties)
Uncertainties in 
input data
Parameter 
uncertainty
Uncertain 
equations
Model structure 
uncertainty
Uncertain levels of 
confidence
Uncertainty about 
model validity
Model and 
monitoring 
uncertainty
Action 
uncertainty
Yield 
uncertainty
Goal 
uncertainty
Political 
uncertainty
Uncertainty on 
agenda-setting
Uncertainties about
costs and benefits of
alternative operations
Uncertainty on 
goals and 
preferences
Modeller’s view on uncertainty Decision-makers’s view on uncertainty
Inexactness
Conflicting
evidence
Lack of 
observations/
measurements
Practically
immeasurable
Ignorance
Indeterminacy
Uncertainty
due
to variability
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The process of risk assessment and risk manage-
ment is normally triggered through the formula-
tion of a problem for which a decision is needed.
Prior to the risk assessment a problem-framing
process takes place. This is not solely a scientific
process; it is also a policy process identifying the
issues to be addressed in the risk assessment.
Following the risk assessment, risk decision and
risk management take place. The entire process is
shown in Figure 4.
Risk assessments are conducted to estimate the
consequences, in terms of adverse effects to
human health or the environment, that can be
expected from exposure to given risk agents, and
to assist in judging whether these consequences
are significant enough to require increased mana-
gement or regulation.
Risk assessments vary widely in scope and
complexity, depending on the application. They
range from simple screening analysis to major
analytical efforts that require years of work and
substantial budgets. Despite these variations and
differences, some main, generic task and elements
are common to the majority of risk assessment
procedures. These influence the transparency of
scientific as well as normative and policy issues.
Risk assessment is generally described as consis-
ting of four main steps (European Commission,
2000):
• Hazard identification: The identification of a
risk source(s) capable of causing adverse
effect(s)/event(s) to humans or the environ-
ment species, together with a qualitative des-
cription of the nature of these effect(s)/event(s)
• Hazard characterisation: The quantitative or
semi-quantitative evaluation of the nature of
the adverse health effects to humans and/or
the environment following exposure to a risk
source(s). This must, where possible, include a
dose response assessment.
• Exposure assessment: The quantitative or semi-
quantitative evaluation of the likely exposure of
man and/or the environment to risk sources
from one or more media.
• Risk characterisation: The quantitative or semi-
quantitative estimate, including attendant
uncertainties, of the probability of occurrence
and severity of adverse effect(s)/event(s) in a
given population under defined exposure con-
ditions based on hazard identification, hazard
characterisation and exposure assessment.
Mandate
Scope and problem definition
Typically, an EU directive or national law will pre-
scribe an approval procedure and the conditions
for approval in general terms. Thus, legislation will
prescribe that the decision should be based on a
scientific assessment of the risk of adverse effects
on human health or the environment. It is of cour-
se implied that approval is conditional on the risk
of such adverse effects being sufficiently low. Even
though the general expression ‘adverse effects on
human health or the environment’ leaves a lot of
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Mandate 
problem definition Initial phase
Intensive phase
A
ction phase
Risk 
decision
Risk 
management
Hazard identification
Risk characterisation
Exposure
assessment
Hazard 
characterisation
Figure 4. The entire process of risk 
assessment and risk management
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room for interpretation about which precise type
of adverse effect should be considered, it does,
nevertheless, roughly demarcate the kinds of con-
sideration that can enter into the decision.
Recommendations to improve transparency
The point of the mandate is that the decision con-
text into which the risk assessment enters should
be illuminated as far as possible in advance. We
recommend that the following points be addres-
sed:
• which kind of decision is to be taken, and
hence
• which form of conclusion is needed
• legal foundation
• concerns behind the question, e.g. suspected
hazards etc.
• the criteria considered relevant
• levels of acceptable risk (if possible)
• expectations concerning the scope of the risk
assessment
• explicit limitations
• attitudes concerning uncertainties
Decisions about what are to count as adverse
effects on human health or the environment, and
what level of risk of the occurrence of these effects
is unacceptable, are delegated to the discretion of
the competent authorities. These decisions make
up the value premise of an actual decision. Thus,
an actual decision is based on a risk assessment of
a number of potential hazards. The risk assess-
ment concludes in a characterisation of the risk for
the specific adverse effects each of these hazards is
assumed to have a potential for. The decision then
states whether or not this overall level of risk is
acceptable.
How can this value premise be presented in a
clear way?
Our recommendation is that it should be repor-
ted, in a systematic way, which hazards have been
examined, and which risk characteristics concer-
ning specific adverse effects each of them gives
rise to. This should be done for each of the alterna-
tive acts (typically a ban or an approval on certain
conditions) that are under consideration.
In other words, the proposal is that a decision
matrix should be set up in which the expected con-
sequences of each of the acts under consideration
is described in terms of the criteria that enter into
the decision (see Table 2). The criteria for the deci-
sion are precisely the adverse effects actually taken
into consideration. The expected consequences in
each case are given by the conclusion of the risk
assessment, i.e. the risk characterisation. An
example of what this matrix looks like is given in
Table 3. The example is based on the case of GM
fodder beet as described in Appendix 1. Note that
the risk assessment in this case explicitly considers
the risks of using GM fodder beet instead of non-
modified beet (the difference between approval
and ban, so to speak).
The point of the proposal is that all the ele-
ments that actually enter into the decision are pre-
sented systematically and clearly. Hence, it is
implied that effects that are not in the list have not
been taken into consideration. This makes it possi-
ble for outsiders to know whether or not some
consideration or other has been dealt with.
A decision matrix like this should be supple-
mented with two things. First, it should be stated
separately whether certain potential hazards or
certain possible adverse effects have deliberately
been excluded, e.g. because they are considered to
be completely unlikely. Thereby it is signalled that
the worry in question has been considered but
eventually not taken into serious consideration.
This makes it possible for an outsider to infer that
possible effects that are not mentioned at all have
not been considered.
Second, the reasons underlying the final choice
of act should be described. In so far as quantitati-
ve criteria of acceptance have been used, they
should of course be reported. Otherwise, it should
as far as possible be made clear which considera-
tions the decision put weight on in the judgement
of whether or not to find approval acceptable. 
Table 2. Decision matrix
Criteria Adverse effect 1 Adverse effect 2 Adverse effect 3 …
Acts
Approval Risk characterisation 1 Risk characterisation 2 Risk characterisation 3
Ban Status quo Status quo Status quo
CBR Rapport Hidden values indhold  17/05/05  11:33  Side 18
19
Hazard identification
Aim and characteristics
The objective of hazard identification is to esta-
blish a causal link between a risk source and an
adverse effect. The identified hazards thus make
up the fundamental demarcation of a risk assess-
ment problem, and the risk assessment will – on
the basis of further premises involving hazard cha-
racterisation and exposure assessment – lead to a
conclusion about the hazard in question in the
form of a risk characterisation.
Hazard identification is merely a qualitative
exercise. The quantitative assessment is the sub-
ject of exposure assessment and hazard characte-
risation.
In practice the hazard identification phase is
seldom a distinctive part of the risk assessment. It
can be viewed as a further scope-defining part of
the objectives of the risk assessment. It is signifi-
cant to establish a close correspondence between
the hazard identification and the previous and the
subsequent steps of the risk assessment process.
Problem-framing and hypotheses
The word ‘hazard’ is central and often a subject of
disagreement. Hazards can be viewed as acts and
phenomena that have the potential to produce
harm or undesirable consequences to humans and
what they value. Hazards may come from physical
phenomena (such as radioactivity, sound waves,
magnetic fields, fire, floods, explosions), chemicals
(ozone, mercury, dioxins, carbon dioxide, drugs,
food additives), organisms (viruses, bacteria),
commercial products (toys, tools, automobiles), or
human behaviour (drinking, driving, firing guns).
Hazards can also come from information (e.g.
information that a person carries a gene that
increases his or her susceptibility to cancer may
expose the person to job discrimination or increa-
sed insurance costs) (Stern & Fineberg, 1996).
Identification implies an exploration of acts
and phenomena, a choice of those considered
capable of causing adverse effect(s)/event(s), i.e.
hazards, and the putting to one side of those not
considered capable of causing adverse
effect(s)/event(s).
‘Risk window’ – systems thinking
Hazard identification is closely connected with the
delimitation of the system. A risk assessment views
the world through a ‘risk window’ that only makes
visible that which has been predefined as a rele-
vant risk, i.e. the demarcation in space and time of
the possible adverse effects to be assessed and the
choice of hazards to be assessed for possible
adverse effects (Jensen et al., 2003). It should be
stressed that the process of defining a ‘risk win-
dow’ consists of a number of choices, so transpa-
rency pertaining to the defining process and its
basic assumptions is crucial. 
Defining a ‘risk window’ is in systems-thinking
terms equal to defining system boundaries, e.g.
temporal boundaries, geographical boundaries,
impact assessment boundaries. Impact assess-
ment boundaries are essential as this type of
boundary defines the types of concern that are
addressed (or not addressed) in the risk assess-
ment. It is important to briefly say why issues are
left out. E.g. organic farmers have argued that a
legitimate concern is the impact on their produc-
tion of genes spread from modified crops to orga-
nic crops; this type of impact is normally not con-
sidered in risk assessments of genetically modified
crops.
In relation to risks, the notion of systems also
emphasises the transmission mechanism through
Table 3. Decision matrix - an example using the GM fodder beet case
Criteria
Difference 
to use of 
non-modified
fodder beet
Toxic effects
of the produ-
ced enzyme
No documen-
ted effects
Allergenic
effects
No documen-
ted effects
Health risks
from using the
beet to food
production
No documen-
ted effects
Invasion of
the modified
fodder beet
outside culti-
vated areas
No reason to
expect ecolo-
gical conse-
quences
Hybridisation
with the wild
relative Beta
maritima
No reason to
expect ecolo-
gical conse-
quences
Spread of the
resistance
gene to weed
beet
Good practice
recommended
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which an initial disturbance amplifies, spreads
inside or even beyond given boundaries, interacts
with other disturbances and ultimately alters the
functioning of a process. The system in question
thus involves the various components of an unex-
pected event: the causative event, repercussions
and final consequences. Hence, system demarca-
tion is of importance not only for the system boun-
daries but also for the understanding of the sys-
tem’s dynamics and thus for the assessment of
consequences and probabilities.
Setting up reliable hypotheses
Hazard identification depends on setting up reaso-
nable hypotheses; and as is well known from the
philosophy of science, there is no systematic way
of generating true hypotheses. Hazard identifica-
tion can be based on guidelines, checklists, experi-
ence from previous risk assessments, reports on
undesired events, group sessions etc. In some
cases, it is possible to work one’s way backwards
from a well-defined type of adverse effect, through
a number of consecutive steps of necessary condi-
tions for this effect to occur, to the identification of
a hazard. In other cases, a hazard under suspicion
can be tested for the effects it leads to. But these
methods depend to some extent on the researcher
already knowing what he should look for. Hazard
identification therefore depends a lot on the com-
petence, imagination and creativity of the risk
assessors.
The crucial element of hazard identification is
the choice of what should be considered adverse
effect(s)/event(s). The uncertainty this involves
will be greatest in the case of new activities, pro-
cesses or products with which there is little or no
experience. It will be less pronounced in the case
of items with which there is more experience. In
terms of transparency, it will be impossible to list
hazards not yet identified.
The upshot is, however, that there is no way to
ensure the completeness of a specific hazard iden-
tification. 
Recommendations and perspectives
The main problem related to transparency is not
the normative character of hazard identification,
but to explain how hazards have been explored,
evaluated and finally selected/ignored. The only
possibility is to report the attempts that have been
made to identify relevant hazards, and the consi-
deration involved in ensuring the highest possible
level of completeness.
The presentation of the outcome of a hazard iden-
tification contains three main elements: a) the
reason why certain acts and phenomena have
been identified and viewed as hazards, i.e. being
capable of causing adverse effect(s)/event(s); b)
the reason why certain other acts and phenomena
have been considered but viewed as being harm-
less; and c) discussion of  (technical, methodologi-
cal and epistemological) uncertainties related to
hazard identification and how these have been
taken into account during the hazard identifica-
tion process. This can be expressed in tabular
form:
Hazard characterisation 
Aim and characteristics
The hazard characterisation seeks to identify the
quantitative relationship between exposure to the
risk source and the nature and extent of the adver-
se effect (on human health or the environment),
possibly in the form of a dose response curve. 
Hazard characterisation is sometimes referred
to as “effects assessment” or “dose-response
assessment”.
Uncertainties and dilemmas
Data – quality, availability, applicability 
Hazard characterisation is typically based on tes-
ting of some form or other. Often, however, there
are severe practical, economic or moral limits to
the kind of testing that can be done. For instance,
it is in general not possible to conduct toxicologi-
cal testing on humans. Instead, animals are used. 
The hazard characterisations based on data
obtained from test systems, or from field and epi-
demiological studies on humans or ecosystems,
may be supported by estimates derived from com-
putational methods. On top of this, there is the
problem of transferring the results obtained in
limited experimental settings to the relevant con-
text, e.g. transferring animal test results to human
conditions. This transfer will often be surrounded
by great uncertainty and be a source of conflict
20
Acts and Adverse Adverse Uncertainty
phenomena effects effects
considered ignored
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and controversy. Therefore, the hazard characteri-
sation is strongly affected by the quality and avai-
lability of data, and by the coverage, completeness
and uncertainty of methods and models.
Thresholds
In the hazard identification phase, various thres-
holds or trade-off levels concerning adverse effects
have to be established. Scientific evidence can
underlie these thresholds, but often lack of know-
ledge means that the thresholds are determined in
other, less transparent ways, e.g. by the introduc-
tion of safety factors, or by comparison with simi-
lar compounds or situations. 
Recommendations and perspectives
Transparency related to hazard characterisation
must address argumentation connected with, and
documentation of, the established thresholds. The
argumentative part will contain a presentation of
reasons for the thresholds concerning adverse
effects together with a presentation of conflicting
viewpoints. The documentation will present the
data used and the methods and models, together
with a thorough discussion of the related (techni-
cal, methodological and epistemological) uncer-
tainties, and how these may affect the trade-off
levels and consequently also the final decision.
Exposure assessment 
Aim and characteristics
The steps involved in exposure assessment vary
widely, because circumstances differ with respect
to how much is known about existing exposures
and what data and information are available. A
commonly used approach in exposure assessment
uses evaluative or interpretative scenarios. 
Uncertainties and dilemmas
Exposure assessment depends heavily on the avai-
lability of relevant measurement data or estimated
modelling data. Measurement data can often be
rather expensive to generate, whereas modelling
data often are relatively cheap to obtain. In most
cases, therefore, exposure assessments will have to
be based on some form of modelling, based on a
number of assumptions. As a consequence, a good
deal of what is done is derived from models and
from generalised assumptions about relevant phy-
sical parameters and human behaviour. This is of
course also surrounded by some uncertainty. The
main question with measurement data is whether
they are representative for the exposure scenario
in question. Modelling data may sometimes be
rather uncertain, depending on model assump-
tions, model complexity, data quality etc. 
Lack of knowledge about actual exposure is one
of the weaker links in the knowledge chain sup-
porting risk assessments. Lack of knowledge com-
prises, beyond data quality, also understanding of
the dynamics within the system and consequently
also the scenarios in question. What concerns
transparency in the exposure assessment phase
key challenges are: 1) explanation and presenta-
tion of scenarios describing exposure pathways,
doses, vulnerable objects, causal relations, likeli-
hood etc., and 2) presentation of the impact of
assumptions and uncertainties in the scenario
development.
Recommendations and perspectives
Scenarios can be a useful and transparent way to
present the outcome of an exposure assessment,
because it is possible in scenarios to show path-
ways, causal relations, vulnerable objects etc. A
weak point here, however, is the discussion and
presentation of pathways, causal relations etc. that
are not included in the scenarios but were consi-
dered during the exposure assessment. In a com-
prehensive documentation for the exposure
assessment these considerations will appear as a
supplementary part of the argumentation for the
selected scenarios.
Risk characterisation 
Aim and characteristics
The risk characterisation is the concluding task. It
combines the principal findings of the hazard
identification, hazard characterisation and expo-
sure assessment in an integrated picture of the
nature and expected frequency and severity of
adverse effects in exposed populations and ecosy-
stems. 
The ‘bottom line’ forthcoming from the risk
characterisation is a primary determinant of the
risk decision and management phase following
the risk assessment. 
Uncertainties and dilemmas
The risk characterisation builds on the previous
phases, and the uncertainties are therefore carried
over into, and aggregated in, the risk characterisa-
tion. The level of uncertainty in risk assessments is
in many cases much higher than that accepted in
21
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pure science. Whereas pure science is a more or
less unending search for truth, the objective of risk
assessment is to provide the foundation for a prac-
tical decision about approval or disapproval of
some activity, process or product. As such, risk
assessment is constrained by a range of limitations
stemming from the decision context: e.g. the con-
clusion has to be delivered within a limited time
frame and the assessment has to be conducted on
a limited budget; furthermore, practical obstacles
and moral constraints seriously limit what kind of
experiments can be performed.
In pure science, there is time to wait for uncer-
tainties to be resolved. The authorities who requi-
re, and will depend on, a risk assessment, on the
other hand, do not have this length of time to wait.
They will have to act on the information that is
available within reasonable time and budget con-
straints, however limited. Since the objective of the
risk assessment is to provide information for a
practical decision, the assessment has to be gui-
ded by values that are instrumental for this deci-
sion. The question is not so much ‘When is a
hypothesis sufficiently justified for it to be accep-
ted as very likely to be true?’, but rather ‘When is a
risk sufficiently characterised for the choice of
action?’
It is very important for the policy-maker to
know about uncertainty (including the different
types of uncertainty and their sources (see Figure
3)). Suppose, for a moment, that risk assessments
only reported the most likely hypothesis. The deci-
sion rule known as ‘maximising expected utility’ is
normally characterised as being risk neutral – that
is, it recommends indifference between getting
some value for certain or choosing a lottery with a
possible better and a possible worse result, but
with the same expected (i.e. probability weighted)
value. The idea of ‘maximising expected utility’ is
to give some weight to unlikely outcomes by weig-
hing them with their probability. However, a pro-
cedure based on only the most likely outcomes will
ignore unlikely outcomes. Hence, it will necessa-
rily take a risk seeking attitude; that is, it will run
even greater risks than a risk neutral attitude max-
imizing expected utility would. But the authorities
are expected to take a precautionary attitude to
risks, i.e. a more risk aversive attitude than just
maximising expected utility. Clearly, they cannot
simply ignore unlikely outcomes.
The decision that the evidence is sufficiently
strong to warrant the scope and purpose of the risk
assessment is always a matter of judgement. In
most cases, risk assessors have to conclude on the
basis of already collected data and cannot wait for
more evidence. They are obliged to accept a trade-
off between reducing the risk of false positives, i.e.
the risk of accepting a false hypothesis, or reducing
the risk of false negatives, i.e. the risk of rejecting a
true hypothesis – for it is not possible to reduce
both. Policy-makers, therefore, need to consider
whether or not to act on uncertain possibilities.
The uncertainty of the choice situation makes it
necessary for risk assessors to characterise the evi-
dence for each possible hypothesis and the likeli-
hood of its being true. This might run up against
one of the virtues often associated with pure scien-
ce: the conservative burden of proof. In pure sci-
ence, the risk of false positives is often considered
more important than the risk of false negatives.
However, the authorities have to show precaution.
Consequently, they have to take seriously the pos-
sibility of an unlikely hypothesis being true. There-
fore, in order to serve the decision-makers, risk
assessors should put more weight on the risk of fal-
se negatives than they would do if they were enga-
ged in a scientific investigation with pure science
as its objective.
Recommendations and perspectives
The main problem in this phase seems to be how
to handle, evaluate and present the uncertainties.
In practice some of these uncertainties are ignored
in order to reach a conclusion. Therefore, it is
important, in the presentation of the conclusion,
to state clearly which uncertainties have been con-
sidered significant and which have been ignored.  
In our view, one way to present the uncertainti-
es is to describe in an exhaustive way relevant,
mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses affec-
ting the final choice. This suggestion is based on
decision theory, and the notion of uncertainty
involved corresponds roughly to “uncertainties
about costs and benefits of alternative operations”
in Figure 3. By hypotheses affecting the final choi-
ce, we mean combinations of exposure scenarios
and dose response hypotheses, each leading to a
conclusion about the frequency and severity of
adverse effects for the choice of a given action.
There are three reasons for taking this view. First, it
is the aggregated uncertainty in the final choice
that is relevant for the decision-maker. Secondly,
listing the alternative hypotheses forces both risk
assessors and policy-makers to consider also unli-
kely possibilities. Thirdly, an exhaustive list makes
it easier to ensure that the ascription of probabili-
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ties to the different hypotheses is consistent, i.e.
that the probabilities add up to a total of 1.
Table 4 contains an example of a choice situa-
tion based on a risk assessment presenting alter-
native hypotheses. The table illustrates a simplifi-
ed choice situation with uncertainty about the
causal relations between a certain activity, process
or product and a certain set of adverse effects.
Each of the scenarios represents different combi-
nations of exposure and dose response relation-
ship. Depending on the actual state of the world,
i.e. the true scenario, the choices of allowing or
banning the activity, process or product in ques-
tion will have the consequences outlined. The con-
sequences are described by the risk characterisa-
tion, given that a specific scenario hypothesis is
true, plus the estimated costs of choosing the pre-
cautionary action.
The uncertainty is that the actual state of the
world (i.e. the true scenario) is not known at the
time when the choice has to be made. Perhaps
probabilities can be assigned to each of the scena-
rios, indicating how likely they are to be true. If
there is only a little uncertainty, one of the scena-
rios is very likely to be true. But even so, it might be
helpful to consider certain rather unlikely scena-
rios.
By way of example, consider the matrix that can be
uncovered from the Southwood Working Party’s
risk assessment concerning BSE in 1988 (Jensen,
forthcoming): see Table 5. The uncertainty in this
case concerns hazard identification, i.e. whether
or not a causal connection exists between the BSE
agent and a Creutzfeld-Jacob-like disease in
humans. However, even though the uncertainty in
this case is great, it is possible to consider certain
scenarios in which BSE can be transmitted to
humans. We can imagine high or low exposure,
and we can imagine that a low or a high dose of
infected material is infectious. This gives us the
following table (in which the risk characterisations
are mere stipulations by us), where uncertainty
about exposure and dose-response are added to
the picture and finally “added up” (see Table 6).
One point about systematic consideration of
uncertainty is that, when one does this, certain cri-
tical questions may become apparent. Thus, in this
case, it seems clear that the size of the infectious
dose might be rather important. Perhaps this
insight might have triggered animal experiments
on this matter at an earlier stage. Such experi-
ments were in fact conducted at a rather late stage.
Table 4. Example of a choice situation based on a risk assessment 
presenting alternative hypotheses
Scenario n
No implications for
human health and/or
the environment
No implications for
human health and/or
the environment
Costs of preventive
and remedial 
measures
...
...
...
Scenario n-1
Fewer implications
for human health
and/or the environ-
ment 
Very few implications
for human health
and/or the environ-
ment 
Costs of preventive
and remedial 
measures
Scenario 1
Serious consequen-
ces for human health
and/or the environ-
ment
Quite a few impli-
cations for human
health and/or the
environment 
Costs of preventive
and remedial 
measures
Allow the activity,
process or product
Do not allow the acti-
vity, process or pro-
duct
States of 
the world
The activity, process or product is causally related
to adverse effects
The activity, process or product
is not causally related to 
adverse effectsActs 
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Risk decision 
Approval
The purpose is to give authorisation to (or with-
hold it from) the hazardous activity, and to declare
the conditions and restrictions under which the
hazardous activity must be operated. 
Dilemmas and concerns
How can the choice of an acceptable level of risk
be justified? The choice involves controversial
issues, and this is exactly the reason why it is
important for policy-makers to be able to justify
the final choice.
The choice is a choice between alternative acts,
including different risk management strategies.
Hence, the considerations involve a comparison of
the possible consequences and their likelihood for
each possible act. The act to choose is the act
which – with sufficient certainty – ensures an
acceptable level of occurrence of adverse effects.
But how is this level to be determined?
Uncertainties are also related to the decision
situation (see Figure 3). There might be uncertain-
ties related to agenda-setting, risk acceptance cri-
teria, conflicting objectives, priorities and inter-
ests. We have no clear recommendations that con-
cern these types of uncertainty. We can only stress
that an approval/disapproval is taken on a specific
understanding of the decision situation, and that
Table 6. Scenarios in the event that BSE can be transmitted to humans
High exposure
Low infectious
dose
Extremely
serious consequ-
ences for human
health
Limited consequ-
ences for human
health
Costs of precau-
tionary measures
High exposure
High infectious
dose
Limited consequ-
ences for human
health
Almost no conse-
quences for human
health
Costs of precau-
tionary measures
Low exposure
Low infectious
dose
Serious consequ-
ences for human
health
Few consequen-
ces for human
health
Costs of precau-
tionary measures
Low exposure
High infectious
dose
Limited consequ-
ences for human
health
Almost no conse-
quences for human
health
Costs of precau-
tionary measures
BSE cannot be
transmitted to
humans
No consequences
for human health
No consequences
for human health
Costs of precau-
tionary measures
Do nothing
Precautionary 
measures
Scenarios
Acts 
Table 5. Risk assessment of BSE
No consequences for human health
No consequences for human health
Costs of precautionary and remedial 
measures
Extremely serious consequences 
for human health
Limited consequences for 
human health
Costs of preventive and remedial
measures
Do nothing
Precautionary 
measures
Hazard BSE can be transmitted 
to humans
BSE cannot be transmitted 
to humansActs 
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this understanding should be presented as trans-
parently as possible.
In the absence of other considerations, there is
a natural tendency to require the lowest possible
risk level. If a lower level could be achieved, how
can a higher level be justified? In order to block
this logic, the first report on the harmonisation of
risk assessment procedures (European Commis-
sion, 2000) suggested that assessments of benefits
be incorporated into risk assessments. The idea is
that for an activity, process or product involving
great benefits, it might be reasonable to run a gre-
ater risk than it would be for an activity, process or
product involving only slight benefits. Indeed,
ordinary theories of decision-making under risk or
uncertainty would deem it irrational not to consi-
der the likely benefits of the envisaged activity,
process or product when determining the accepta-
ble level of risk. 
However, for legal reasons it is not clear to what
extent this can be done. Thus, the present approval
procedure for GMOs, as prescribed by the Directi-
ve, is exclusively concerned with the assessment of
risk of adverse effects. It does not mention the
assessment of possible benefits. This reflects the
liberal foundation of GM regulation (Jensen,
2002). The job of the state is only to protect its citi-
zens against harms and to reduce the risk of such
harms. Beyond this, people and companies have a
right to choose for themselves. Authorities which,
on the basis of an assessment of expected benefits
and their comparison with risks, make choices on
the citizen’s behalf would be acting paternalistical-
ly; and there might be legal limit on how far this is
possible.
An important consideration is comparison
with the level of acceptable risk in other areas. If
the constraints in one area are either much more
or much less strict than in other comparable areas,
this is likely to be experienced as unjust differenti-
al treatment. On the other hand, the choice of are-
as in which approval based on risk assessment is
required is to a large extent the outcome of politi-
cal processes. In these processes, new, unknown
and controversial technologies tend to be promi-
nent. Equality before the law might then conflict
with the democratic duty to make decisions in
accordance with the public’s wishes.
Risk assessments of emerging technologies are
often characterised by lack of norms and stan-
dards. Consider the deliberate release into the
environment of GMOs. Here, indirect effects, dela-
yed effects and cumulative long-term effects are
situated in a grey area in which lack of knowledge
and experience makes them difficult to identify
and consequently also to assess and operate. For
these types of technology it may be pointless, and
perhaps impossible, to define clear limits for unin-
tended and adverse effects (Kjær, 2004). Here it is
important for experience to be collected and eva-
luated case by case in order to improve the criteria
set for future risk assessments. But here it is also
important to be aware of that setting criteria case
by case can lead to differences from case to case,
and consequently from one application to the
other, concerning the normative premises for the
approval decisions. 
Certain kinds of consequence, such as death or
irreversible harm to the environment, raise serious
problems in determining a level of acceptable risk.
If the risk cannot be reduced to zero, which is
almost always the case, some level of risk of death,
e.g., will have to be accepted; but what level? In
some areas, there are quantitative levels of accep-
table fatality. However, there is no clear consensus
about how this level should be determined; and in
many areas the thought of accepting that some
number of people will die is very controversial.
The ‘Precautionary Principle’
Uncertainty about the consequences of the deci-
sion raises further ethical and political questions
for the authorities. Preventive or remedial measu-
res might reduce the extent of adverse effects. They
do so at a cost, however, and this cost is, in a way,
wasted if it transpires that the hazard they guard
against is harmless. It is of course true that this is
so with every kind of insurance premium. The
point is that, as long as events are uncertain, the
cost of reducing probabilities and consequences
about what might happen may be worth bearing. 
Judgements as to whether preventive and
remedial measures are worth the cost will turn on
how serious the unwanted consequences are con-
sidered to be, how likely they are to occur, and the
efficiency of the envisaged precautionary and
remedial measures. Hence, we need to consider
how to weigh a reduction of consequences with
this or that likelihood against the costs of this
reduction. This raises further ethical and political
questions about what level of precaution the aut-
horities should choose.
The EU generally adheres to the Precautionary
Principle (CEC, 2000). The Precautionary Principle
claims that, in cases where “there are reasonable
grounds for concern that potential hazards may
25
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affect the environment or human, animal or plant
health” (p. 9), but where the insufficient or incon-
clusive nature of the scientific data precludes the
risk from being “fully demonstrated or quantified
or its effects determined” with certainty (p. 13), the
authorities may be justified in acting (i.e. restric-
ting the liberties of a person, company, or organi-
zation) to reduce the alleged risk.
Recommendations to improve transparency
A suggestion that might provide a helpful structu-
re for the full explanation of a decision is presented
below (OXERA, 2000):
• the decision was about X
• this is important because of Y
• the options were a, b, c …
• advice was received from p, q, r ….; they were
chosen because …
• their advice was …, and hence the consequen-
ces and risks of each option were …
• in reaching the decision, account was taken of
…. (e.g. international treaty obligations, long-
term policies, implications for other areas of
policy)
• the criteria adopted when considering the
advice were …
• where there was conflicting advice, p and q
were accepted (and r rejected) because …
• hence the decision is …. because … (a summa-
ry of the earlier points, the values that were
applied and the weight that was given to con-
flicting arguments).
Decision-making processes dealing with hazar-
dous activities can be characterised as decision-
making with multiple objectives and by prepara-
tion and evaluation of alternatives where objecti-
ves of different types and values are weighed.
Some authors maintain that multi-criteria map-
ping provides a systematic and transparent tool for
exploring assumptions in judgements about issues
such as GM crops (ESRC, 1999) (Stirling & Mayer,
1999) (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993).
Risk reduction and management
Aim and characteristics
Risk management is a process of following up the
decisions and actions in order to ascertain that risk
containment or reduction with respect to a parti-
cular hazard is assured. It comprises analyses and
choice of a particular course of preventive or
remedial measures and actions from an array of
possible control options, and accumulation of evi-
dence through monitoring and evaluation to sup-
port or give reasons for revision of assumptions
and results of risk assessment plus follow-up on
actions.
Problems and dilemmas 
Risk management is a development and imple-
mentation of strategies which is by nature value
driven. If precaution is intended to play a decisive
role in the risk management phase, it must be
included as a value already in the risk assessment
phase. 
Preventive and remedial measures can be rat-
her expensive in terms of capital as well as time,
and it is vital carefully to evaluate and balance the
costs against obtainable benefits. Preventive mea-
sures are directed to the reduction of the probabi-
lity/likelihood of adverse events, while remedial
measures are directed to the reduction of the con-
sequences/effects of adverse events. In cases in
which the systems dynamics and scenario mecha-
nism are correctly understood, the preventive and
remedial measures will have the intended effect on
probability/likelihood and consequences/effects.
The scenario model can be used to pick out and
present both where, in the course of the scenario,
the measures are going to be implemented, and
their expected function and impact.
Also, monitoring programmes can be expensi-
ve with long time horizons before evidence is gat-
hered, and this can put pressure on the competent
authorities with respect to not setting up approval
conditions with significant monitoring require-
ments. 
A question related to these conflicting issues is
this: who is going to bear the costs, and who will
get the benefits?
Recommendations and perspectives
Development of a risk management plan inclu-
ding (McColl et al., 2000):
• how and when the risk management strategy
will be carried out
• the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities
of individuals and organisations
• plans for information, communication and
involvement of interested and affected parties 
• criteria that will be used for monitoring and
evaluation
• training requirements, staffing requirements
and financing requirements
• periodically audit and review of control options
and report any changes to the system.
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It is recommended that intended benefits and
expected costs of control options are thoroughly
assessed and documented in order to make it cle-
ar to third parties how risk reduction and manage-
ment are being carried out. The documentation of
assessed preventive and remedial measures
should contain argumentation for the selection as
well as measures.
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The scientific content of public policy decisions is
growing rapidly. The relationship between science
and government is an uneasy one, and a wide vari-
ety of advisory structures may be employed to sup-
port the policy-making process. Advisers operate
at all levels of the political system, and the adviso-
ry process can be initiated in a number of ways,
e.g. advice may be sought by the head of govern-
ment, ministers or civil servants, or through legis-
lation (Glynn et al., 2001). 
The scientific advisory structure affects both
knowledge generation and the selection of scienti-
fic input, and therefore the factual premises of a
risk assessment. Transparency not only depends on
the factual premises but also on how efficient
knowledge is transferred, communicated and util-
ised within the scientific and policy communities.
Efficient knowledge transfer is required if the actors
are to achieve a common understanding of the fac-
tual premises of a risk assessment. Lack of com-
mon understanding between scientific advisers
and policy-makers can lead to different understan-
dings of the content and causal relations of the risk
assessment, and this can lead to vague or unclear
conclusions – and ultimately to lack of transparen-
cy. Therefore, it is important to address transparen-
cy issues that concern the process of generation,
communication and transfer of knowledge and sci-
entific results in appraisal procedures.
The communication and advisory process esta-
blished around the preparation and application of
a risk assessment differs from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. Despite these variations and differences,
there are some key generic tasks and elements
which are common for the majority of risk assess-
ment procedures. These elements are discussed in
the following section. They are viewed in the light
of the issues discussed in the previous chapters of
this report.
Knowledge
Knowledge transfer 
Setting focus on transparency related to utilisation
of scientific results in approval decisions, it is criti-
cal to be aware of the complexity of knowledge and
knowledge transfer in relation to tasks and actors.
When an individual performs, and communicates
about, a task, the underlying knowledge types and
their internal relations can be categorised in the
way indicated in Figure 5 (Koskinen et al., 2003)
(McBriar et al., 2003) (Choo, 1998) (Scharmer,
2001):
• Tacit knowledge that is not easily visible and
expressible. Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in
an individual’s experience; it consists of sche-
mata, beliefs, and perceptions stored so deep in
the worldview of an individual that we can take
them for granted. 
• Explicit knowledge that can be represented in
words, drawings, plans, equations or numbers;
this can easily be communicated between
people. 
• Knowledge-not-yet-embodied addresses phe-
nomena like imagination and perceiving
opportunities. 
• Cultural knowledge consists of the shared be-
liefs, norms and values in which organisational
members construct reality, recognise the rele-
vance of new information and evaluate alterna-
tive interpretations and actions. 
• Personal characteristics, such as stress tolera-
tion and competences, which either enhance
or decrease an individual’s ability to perform a
task.
Knowledge that is more or less explicit can be
represented in documents and databases and can
be transferred with reasonable accuracy. Tacit
knowledge transfer generally requires extensive
personal contact. From a transparency point of
view explicit knowledge can be made accessible
and visible to third parties, whereas the underlying
individual and institutional experiences, beliefs,
perceptions and values rooted in tacit and cultural
knowledge will generally be invisible to third parti-
es. There are no easy ways to overcome these inhi-
bitors of knowledge transfer. One way is to build
relationships and trust through face-to-face mee-
tings. Another way is to establish times and places
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for dialogue and participation, e.g. fairs, talk
rooms, public meetings and conferences.
Knowledge production
The knowledge foundation utilised in an approval
decision has to be regarded in a broad perspective
covering the actor relations and the origin of the
knowledge. 
Triple helix model 
One thesis is that the boundaries between public
and private, science and technology, university
and industry are in flux. University-industry-
government relations can be viewed as a triple
helix of evolving networks of communication and
co-operation. Public and private organisations are
assuming tasks that were formerly the province of
the other sectors (Leydesdorff, 2000). The triple
helix model argues that a knowledge infrastructu-
re is generated in overlapping institutional sphe-
res, with each taking the role of the other, and with
hybrid organisations emerging at the interfaces
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Putting transparency in the triple helix perspecti-
ve, it can be asked how these new conditions for
knowledge creation will influence transparency in
appraisal procedures requiring scientific advice. In
the public debate impartial and independent
experts are frequently called upon, but from a trip-
le helix perspective, arguing that a new knowledge
creation infrastructure is under development, one
consequence can be that the origin and providers
of knowledge will be less obvious, and this will
make it difficult to fulfil the requirement concer-
ning utilisation of unbiased and balanced know-
ledge in government decision processes.
Mode-1 and Mode-2 knowledge
Another thesis has been formulated by Gibbons
(1999). Gibbons says that a new social contract
between science and society is under develop-
ment. Under the prevailing contract, science has
been expected to produce reliable knowledge, pro-
vided merely that it communicates its discoveries
to society. Under the contract now in develop-
ment, scientific knowledge must be socially
robust, and its production must be seen by society
to be both transparent and participative. This
change in knowledge production is characterised
by Gibbons et al. (1994) as a transition from Mode-
1 knowledge production to Mode-2 knowledge
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production. Mode-1 knowledge is generated wit-
hin a disciplinary, primarily cognitive context.
Mode-2 knowledge is created in broader, transdis-
ciplinary, social and economic contexts. Mode-2
knowledge production has tended to erode the
demarcation between traditional ‘knowledge’
institutions, such as universities and research
institutes, and other kinds of organisation
(Nowotny et al., 2001).
The creation of knowledge in a transdisciplinary
context involves different people with different
perspectives and different ways of working. The
research process will require tacit, explicit, and
cultural knowledge from different disciplines and
institutions. One of the challenges is to transfer
knowledge between disciplines and institutions,
and on that basis to create new knowledge. The
resulting outcome can, on the one hand, be com-
plex, which makes it less transparent. On the other
hand, it can be reflexive and applicable, which
makes it more socially robust. Due to the problem
and application oriented approach, Mode-2 know-
ledge is context sensitive and highly specific. This
raises the question to what degree Mode-2 know-
ledge will be transparent to people not familiar
with the context. Finally, the significance of dialo-
gue and open relationships in Mode-2 knowledge
creation will open up the possibility of improved
transparency.
The science/policy decision-making 
process
As discussed in the previous chapter, a risk assess-
ment cannot be characterised as pure science. It is
constrained by a range of limitations stemming
from the mandate and decision context. In order
to improve transparency, it is essential that the
actors understand how their own and other actors’
contributions are going to be used in the risk
assessment, analysis and management process.
Traditionally, the science/policy decision-
making process could be seen as a continuum,
starting with definition of the mandate, followed
by production of scientific information and know-
ledge, and an assessment process, leading to poli-
cy choices and, finally, political decisions. Along
this continuum, there is a decreasing level of invol-
vement on the part of individual scientists and
their knowledge, and an increasing level of impor-
tance of non-scientific considerations, e.g. econo-
mic and social considerations, see Figure 8
(CCDM, 2002). 
A set of generic functions and relationships in a
policy decision can be listed (OXERA, 2000), see
Figure 9. 
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These generic functions are used in our discussion
of actors and their role in the science/policy deci-
sion-making process.
• Decision-maker: a person with the authority to
make a policy decision. 
• Policy-maker: a person or organisation charged
with assisting a decision-maker in reaching a
decision by providing policy analysis, genera-
ting policy options, or by conducting risk
assessment. 
• Scientific adviser: a person or organisation
responsible for providing scientific input to
policy-making or decision-making. This inclu-
des both scientists expert in narrow disciplines
relevant to the problem in question, and more
broadly-based scientists who are able to inte-
grate several disciplines, and may involve those
within and outside the civil service. 
• Stakeholder representatives: a person or orga-
nisation representing the interests and
opinions of a group with an interest in the out-
come of a particular policy decision.
Scientific advisory structure
Dilemmas and concerns
Two contradictory concerns affect scientific advi-
ce: on the one hand, the need for advisers to be
seen as independent is increasingly important
(Glynn et al., 2001); on the other hand, the compe-
tent authority is expected to identify, comprehend
and build their policy on robust and high quality
knowledge in order to provide high-level expertise
in advice to the government. Fulfilling the second
concern can fundamentally change how scientists
and policy-makers work with, and relate to, each
other. The process of using science information to
inform decision-making may become one where
science/policy communication is regular and
informative, teamwork and multidisciplinary initi-
atives are the norm, and science and policy staff
work together in pursuit of shared objectives
(CCDM, 2002). The two contradictory concerns
one demanding independent advisory bodies, and
the other asking for science and policy working
close together to improve the scientific quality of
the decision – can easily come into conflict, and
this sets up a challenge for the competent authori-
ties to build a robust, transparent and legitimate
decision process.
Providing scientific advice for policy-making is
a complex procedure involving and affecting a
variety of actors with differences in perspective,
competences and interests. For many scientists,
the primary interest in these disputes is to draw
the line between science and policy in ways that
best preserve the authority and integrity of scien-
ce, whereas other actors would draw this line in a
way that maximises their control over social deci-
sions. When focusing transparency in decision-
making, it is to crucial to reflect on the problema-
tic nature of the provision of knowledge, on con-
flicting views on its application, and on its insepa-
rability from context.
In principle, the competent authority can free-
ly select scientific advisers. In real life there are at
least two things to think about. It is an advantage
to have close relationship between policy-makers
and advisers, one based on dialogue and confiden-
ce. In smaller countries like Denmark resources
are limited, and this means there are only a few
competent scientific groups within a specific area.
In practice, this limits the alternatives when scien-
tific advisers are selected. Furthermore, the ques-
tion of selection of scientific advisers is closely
connected to the economic resources allocated for
scientific advisory purposes (Kjær, 2004).
Risk assessment processes are often pressed, in
terms of time and resources. Consequently, the
risk assessors’ work is pressured. Risk assessors are
usually appointed by policy-makers to come up
with a conclusion about the adverse effects of a
substance and have a deadline by which this con-
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clusion should be delivered. Time pressure can
affect the resources allocated for a thorough revi-
ew and the evaluation of available scientific litera-
ture. This in turn may mean that important con-
flicting scientific viewpoints are missed, resulting
in less robust and clear argumentation and docu-
mentation.  
The fact that research is privately funded also
affects openness and transparency. Private com-
panies currently conduct a significant portion of
risk research, and private-sector research is likely
to increase relative to publicly funded research.
New technologies, e.g. gene technology, demand
considerable specialised resources, making it
nearly impossible for publicly funded research to
achieve the same level of expertise. This means
that regulation concerning risk and safety will lar-
gely rely on inputs from private research, and this
will place public policy work in a demanding posi-
tion with limited or no influence on knowledge
creation, together with less access to high level
expertise. 
Finally, it is important to keep the appraisal
procedure simple. The more complex the appraisal
technique employed, the more vulnerable is the
process to oversight, error or manipulation, with
lack of transparency as a resulting effect.
Recommendations to improve transparency
The process by which scientific advice is generated
should always be open to scrutiny. This helps to
ensure freedom from bias and allows stakeholders
to contribute to the advisory process. It is advisa-
ble to describe clearly the relations and correspon-
dence between the applicant, the competent aut-
hority and the scientific advisers. An audit trail of
the scientific advisory process could be made avai-
lable to policy-makes, decision-makers and ulti-
mately stakeholders. The audit trail might cover
the generation of scientific questions; the scienti-
fic arguments, calculations and analyses; alternati-
ve scientific options and uncertainties; and the sci-
entific appraisal of policy options (OXERA, 2000). 
In a broader sense, training programmes for
the policy community could provide information
on the nature of the scientific process (CCDM,
2002). In this context, regular exchange of experi-
ences between jurisdictions responsible for the
regulation of hazardous activities can be construc-
tive and help to show how to make the scientific
advisory structure transparent.
Problem definition
Submission of application
The applicant prepares and submits a risk assess-
ment to the competent authority containing the
applicant’s interpretation of the scope and content
of the risk assessment. 
In connection with an application for delibera-
te release a GMO for any purpose other than that
of being placed on the market, the first contact
between the applicant and the competent authori-
ty is established. Often the applicant is surprised
by the legal requirements governing a risk assess-
ment (Kjær, 2004). The applicant prepares the risk
assessment, and where the extent of the legal
requirements is not fully realised by him or her this
can contribute to reduced transparency.
After receiving the application, the policy-
makers have to decide on conditions, resources
and a time schedule for the scientific advisory pro-
cess, including identification and selection of sci-
entific advisers and considerations concerning the
involvement of stakeholders in the scientific advi-
sory process.
Acceptable level of risk
Setting up criteria is one the most difficult and
controversial parts in risk decisions. The aim is to
make the value premises clear for the subsequent
risk assessment, reduction and management pro-
cess.
The characterisation of unintended events and
adverse effects is inseparably bound up with the
objectives and the acceptance criteria. A precondi-
tion for setting up precise criteria for acceptable
risk will be an identification of the different types
of relevant adverse effect on human health and the
environment. For each type of adverse effect it
then has to be decided what total level of occur-
rence of this effect is acceptable. The distribution
of the effect might also be normatively relevant: in
some cases, it is reasonable to set a limit to the risk
run by each individual.
Dilemmas and concerns
Risk acceptance criteria can be of qualitative or
quantitative character. Risk acceptance criteria are
normally to some extent stated in the legislation,
but they can be of vague general character, leaving
a large space for the applicant, the policy-maker as
well as the scientific adviser to adapt or influence
the acceptance criteria of a specific risk assess-
ment process. The consequence can be an unclear
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appraisal and approval process, where the origin
or ownership of essential questions related to
underlying value premises, trade-offs and risk
levels are unclear or even lost. 
In some cases (e.g. for GMOs) the legislation
will list in detail which adverse effects should be
considered, but not in all. Moreover, even a detai-
led list like this should not be read as exhaustive.
Thus, in many cases, when approval for a new acti-
vity, process or product is applied for, the relevant
types of adverse effect are not known in advance.
And even to the extent they are, it seems unwise to
decide on the level of acceptability before the exact
level of occurrence is known. The decision pro-
blem is first fully described when the risk assess-
ment is completed. It seems hazardous to decide
on the normative criteria for approval without util-
ising the knowledge input provided by the risk
assessment.
The problem is, however, that the risk assess-
ment shall provide information on the relevant
risks. It therefore has to take its departure from an
understanding of which types of effect on human
health or the environment it has to consider. Pro-
bably, a risk assessment will also benefit from an
understanding of what the critical levels of occur-
rence are. If there was only one decision-maker
who both decided on the normative criteria for
acceptable risk and acquired the relevant factual
knowledge by performing the risk assessment, this
would not be a problem. In theory, at least, such a
decision-maker would be able to jump from nor-
mative to factual premises, and the other way
round, and make the necessary adjustments. 
In practice, however, the decision on criteria of
acceptable risk and the risk assessment are made
by different persons who are even supposed to
operate independently of each other. This makes it
important that as many as possible of the authori-
ties’ normative considerations are communicated
to the scientific experts before the risk assessment
is undertaken.
In emerging technological domains (e.g. with
GMOs) scientific considerations may help to iden-
tify criteria that were not apparent before. Therefo-
re, here it shall be considered whether to keep the
criteria and acceptability open until scientific
advice has been taken. 
The formulation of acceptance criteria can be
confronted by unrealistic or idealistic standpoints.
Often politicians and the public insist on having a
“zero-level” risk society. In real life this is unattai-
nable, leaving the policy-makers in situations with
no generally accepted decision option. Decisions
have to be taken, and unrealistic or idealistic
standpoints can lead to reluctance to participate
in open discussions and make clear statements
about acceptance criteria.
Recommendations to improve transparency
The multidimensional character of risk problems
(see Figure 2) is important to bear in mind in defi-
ning the mandate. Transparency is improved if it is
made clear how problems are sorted out, and if it
is made clear which problems are included and
which are left out of the appraisal procedure, and
why. 
Further, it would be an advantage if the affec-
ted temporal and geographical scales are identifi-
ed at an early stage in order to consult key stake-
holders being relevant for the specification of the
mandate. 
An important element is the specification of
the task to the scientific advisers – e.g. in an audit
trail. Within the EU it is common for specific terms
of reference to be negotiated before a risk assess-
ment is carried out. In our view, it would be natu-
ral if such written terms of reference describe the
general worries that motivate the risk assessment
and furthermore specify as far as possible the kind
of knowledge considered relevant. The goal is to
obtain a shared understanding of which hazards
and which adverse effects should be considered.
The policy decision should not be delegated to
scientific advisers by posing the questions in such
a way that the scientific advice determines the
policy option to be adopted. The policy-maker
needs to anticipate, as early as possible, those issu-
es for which science will be required, in order to
facilitate timely and informed decision-making.
That is, the policy-maker needs to be competent to
specify scientific questions. The questions should
be refined through dialogue between scientific
advisers and policy-makers, and may be further
refined through challenge by stakeholders (OXE-
RA, 2000). Stronger involvement of stakeholders
may make an important contribution to improve-
ment of transparency at this stage by ensuring that
the range of problems considered is appropriate.
Scientific advice to policy-makers
Concerns and points related to uncertainty
Because of the inherent uncertainties in risk
assessment, values have more influence in risk
assessment than in pure science. Lack of aware-
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ness of value judgement in scientific communities,
and maybe also the scientist’s limited capability to
explicate value judgements, will reduce the trans-
parency of scientific advice as the underlying valu-
es will remain indistinct. Scientists are human,
and so they carry their own inherent biases related
to their professional training, past experiences and
personal views. Often they are unaware of their
personal biases and do not fully realise the extent
to which prejudices can influence professional
judgement. 
Thus, the policy community must be aware of,
and better informed about, the uncertainty of sci-
entific knowledge. It is a challenge for science
community to clearly express the meaning of the
uncertainty to policy-makers. It is a challenge for
the policy community to be able to understand
and interpret the ‘shades of grey’ associated with
uncertainty in scientific information together with
the uncertainties related to the decision context,
and translate that into ‘black’ or ‘white’ policy
actions.   
Coverage and completeness of risk assessment
Policy-makers need a description and evaluation
of the coverage and applicability of the applied
methodologies and data due to the scope and pur-
pose of the risk assessment. This can include a sys-
tematic mapping of sensitivities reflecting context
dependency, irreconcilable values, divergent
option definitions, inconsistent framing assump-
tions, realistic assessments of the robustness of all
conclusions, and description of new evidence
which, if it were to emerge, would cause the advi-
ser to change his or her advice (Stirling, 2001 &
OXERA, 2000).
One of the gravest errors in any type of risk
management process is the presentation of risk
estimates which convey a false impression of accu-
racy and confidence. In no case should the exis-
tence of residual uncertainty be considered a
reason for withholding results. Risk characterisa-
tion is the final vital stage in the risk assessment
process. Perhaps surprisingly, the steps in the risk
characterisation are by no means universally agre-
ed. Judgement plays a key part, and it is necessary
for this to be made transparent (European Com-
mission, 2003) (McColl et al., 2000) (OXERA, 2000).
Recommendations to improve transparency
All participants in the advisory system should be
trained in techniques for posing questions and
operating the various advisory mechanisms. It is
especially important to focus on the transfer of
tacit and cultural knowledge in order to explicate
assumptions and values. E.g. the workshop held
on 7 December 2004 with participation of scienti-
fic advisers and policy-makers indicated difficulti-
es in communication and understanding between
participants with differing education and contras-
ting roles in the appraisal process, and this lack of
common understanding could be a source of redu-
ced transparency.  
It is recommended that there be face-to-face
meetings between risk assessors and policy-
makers in all steps of the appraisal process, with
special emphasis on the distinction between ana-
lysing factual premises and assessing normative
premises, and that the outcome of these meetings
is documented in an audit trail.
At all times the scientific adviser should remain
aware of the basis of the advice. Four such bases
can be recognised, all of which are within the sco-
pe of scientific advice, but each of which merits a
different level of certainty and involves different
values (OXERA, 2000):
• Observation: empirical evidence that is unam-
biguous and uncontentious, although it may
still be open to different interpretations.
• Formal analysis: which should lead to a consis-
tent result, regardless of who conducts the for-
mal analysis.
• Reasoned judgement: the outcome of a disci-
plined approach to a problem, whereby deduc-
tions are made by extrapolation or extension
from the formal analysis.
• Opinion: simple assertion (i.e. a belief), the
value of which depends entirely on the integri-
ty, competence and credibility of the party
expressing the opinion.
Data gaps, and the priority of requirements,
should be clearly communicated to the policy-
makers. Means need to be developed to show the
provision and selection of key documentation and,
where this is the case, the rejection of any substan-
tive submissions. Central questions are (European
Commission, 2003):
• the availability of suitable information on how
the data was derived
• the quality of the experimental work
• the scientific standing in the field of the aut-
hors and their perceived independence
• whether the findings are consistent with the
available literature in the field
• identification and recording all the sources of
data that have been used
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• reporting any important limitations of accessi-
bility of potential significant data
• the weighting given to individual data sets and
the rationale for this
• whether or not stakeholders have the opportu-
nity to submit additional data
• the strategy for dealing with data gaps should
be clarified during the risk evaluation step
• statement of what new evidence, if it were to
emerge, would require the advice to be changed.
Hearings 
Public
For the non-professional, the normative premises
of the legislation can be very difficult to read owing,
on the one hand, to the departmental language
style, and, on the other hand, to difficulty finding a
way through the regulatory framework jungle.
Looking at the EU legislation on “Deliberate release
into the environment of genetically modified orga-
nisms” as an example, the framework consists of a
Directive supplemented by several Commission
Regulations and Commission Decisions. Clari-
fication of the normative premises of the legislation
is important in order to explain to third parties the
normative premises of the risk assessment.
The aim of public hearings is threefold: a) to
give information to the public about new techno-
logies, their consequences and the legislation set-
ting the framework for the appraisal process, b) to
collect comments, viewpoints and objections from
stakeholders on the risk assessment, and c) to pass
on viewpoints from public hearings to the parlia-
ment and the minister.
The hearing statements that come from profes-
sional organisations, such as NGOs, and ordinary
citizens are often of very different character. Public
hearings are one out of the few opportunities for
the general public to express viewpoints within the
policy system. Therefore, all sorts of comment and
statement are expressed. The public hearings may
be regarded as one of only a few battlefields for
debate on future application of new technology,
and consequently as a forum in which a multitude
of actors vie to further their interests. Some hea-
ring statements are purely scientific. Others are
more moral or political. Due to this variety, it can
be difficult to give consistent and transparent tre-
atment of the hearing statements.
Recommendations to improve transparency
When risk assessments are submitted to hearing
partners it should be made clear how the hearing
statements will be used in the appraisal procedure
and which topics will require comment, i.e. topics
contained within the legislative frame. Afterwards,
feedback should be returned to hearing partners
indicating the impact of the hearing statements in
the approval process.
EU
Decisions about risks are to a large extent taken in
the EU. Mutual information is exchanged between
EU member states about new technologies and
their areas of application. This includes the collec-
tion of comments, viewpoints and objections from
EU member states and EU committees on hazar-
dous activities.
This prevalence of supranational procedures
for risk assessment can influence the transparency
in two ways. The documents and discussions are
carried out in English, and this probably leads to
lack of transparency for the public in general. For
the professional actor, common EU rules can lead
to improved transparency (Kjær, 2004). It is recom-
mended, that all documents are available in natio-
nal languages.
The reviews from member states can contain
both strictly scientific arguments and expressions
of national preference. There might be disagree-
ments between the countries, and there might be
national preferences which not are scientifically
motivated. It may be inadvisable to state national
preferences clearly, as this can be regarded as set-
ting up a technical trade barrier. National prefe-
rences might be wrapped up and blurred within a
scientific set of arguments, and the resulting mix-
ture of risk, science, local and national interests
can be very hard to see through. 
Stakeholders
Stakeholders have an important part to play in
ensuring that the scientific questions being asked
are pertinent to the policy issues that are of con-
cern to them. However, active and direct participa-
tion by stakeholders in the generation of scientific
advice itself could lead to the generation of scien-
tific advice that is based on value judgement and
stakeholder views rather than expert analysis of
scientific evidence (OXERA, 2000). Another con-
troversial element is the identification and selec-
tion of stakeholders who are given (or not given)
the opportunity to submit input to the risk assess-
ment. 
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Recommendations to improve transparency
It is recommended that there be a transparent pro-
cedure and a well-documented process for the
identification and selection of stakeholders.
Expert committees
Expert committees are expected to provide objec-
tive, unbiased input to the approval process, e.g.
ensuring that all relevant aspects and information
from an expert point of view are identified and
considered during the appraisal process. In prin-
ciple, their role is similar to that of the scientific
advisers, and consequently they are vulnerable to
the same problems and dilemmas related to trans-
parency. 
Recommendations to improve transparency
It is recommended that there be a transparent pro-
cedure and well-documented process for the iden-
tification and selection of expert committees. The
role of the expert committees should be clearly
specified, and it should be clearly explained what
types of expert committee are to be consulted and
why.
Draft positions to decision-makers
Evaluation of scientific advice
The policy-makers have to evaluate the scientific
advice and other types of input, such as hearings,
to ensure that the documents cover the questions
addressed in the legislation and provide a suffici-
ent basis for draft positions on policy actions. 
Preparation of scientific advice to 
decision-maker
The policy advice shall be strictly within the legis-
lative requirements, and in cases where there is
compliance with the technical requirements in the
legislation, the applicant can anticipate receipt of
an authorisation. Often other viewpoints will have
been accentuated in hearing answers (e.g. argu-
ments for or against the possibility of the forma-
tion of a monopoly following the approval of a
GMO), and in order to improve transparency it is
essential to make clear to third parties which issu-
es that are contained in the legal framework and
which are not.
While scientific information is intended to be a
neutral description, or statement of facts, that
details and distinguishes what is known from what
is not, policy advice recommends a course of
action. The decision-making process can be
encumbered with uncertainties (e.g. concerning
agenda-setting or alternative solutions), and poli-
cy-makers have to reflect the values, and differen-
ces in the values, of the society and/or the groups
they represent not only in the problems and con-
cerns they choose to address, but also in the solu-
tions they consider and the trade-offs they are wil-
ling to make.
Recommendations to improve transparency
When presenting the policy options to the deci-
sion-maker, the policy-maker should make clear
the implications and robustness of the scientific
analysis. This might be achieved by characterising
the policy options according to (OXERA, 2000): 
• expected and possible worst-case outcome
• the degree of reversibility of the option
• sustainability – whether the option can be sus-
tained in the long term
• any precautionary arguments that may be rele-
vant
• the reliability of the key assumptions and evi-
dence
• the source of the advice, and the weight that
should be attributed to that source.
Presentation and communication 
Care should be taken to avoid a form of ‘openness’
that actually obscures key messages through
obscure terminology or dilution of detail in large
volume. Detail should be available to the expert
reviewer, but the aim of this principle is effective
communication with the public. This requires
transparent communication of the key findings,
including uncertainty (OXERA, 2000).
Decision-makers may find that it is useful to
explain how scientific advice and other kind of
input was taken into account in a policy decision.
This would confirm that the scientific advice has
been correctly understood, and that it provides
assurance to the stakeholders that the issues of
concern to them have been addressed. It would
provide valuable feedback to the scientific advisers
and hence contribute to the continual improve-
ment of the scientific advisory system (OXERA,
2000).
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The report contains our reflections and considera-
tions concerning transparency in decision-making
processes dealing with hazardous activities. Our
intention has been to explain, discuss and recom-
mend issues related to content as well as the advi-
sory process and the interaction between content
and process. Our experience is that improving
transparency in risk decisions is a difficult task as it
involves a huge variety and complexity of premises
combined with an advisory process involving
actors with different functions and educational
backgrounds. 
These difficulties were clearly demonstrated in
the workshop held as part of the project (see
Appendix 1). The lessons learned there were that
uncovering the values in risk assessment is tricky
and something to which many are unaccustomed.
It might be necessary to build up new competen-
ces in both the scientific and policy communities if
argumentation and presentation of the normative
and factual premises is going to be an element in
future risk assessment and management. Further,
it was learned that sessions across jurisdictions
responsible for risk assessment and risk manage-
ment can be valuable in allowing an exchange of
experiences.  
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Workshop: 7 December 2004
A cross-institutional workshop was held on 7
December 2004 as part of the project. The partici-
pants were invited from the policy community as
well as the scientific community. Together the par-
ticipants represented a huge variety of disciplines,
job functions and jurisdictions. The idea was to
identify, reflect on, and reach a common under-
standing of, the values in three specific risk assess-
ments:
• a glyphosate resistant fodder beet
• penta-bromo diphenyl ether
• vanadium
The workshop was a mixture of presentations and
group sessions. The main tasks in the group ses-
sions were to concentrate on identified hazards,
adverse effects, uncertainties, risk characterisation
and criteria for risk acceptance. The main outco-
me from the group sessions is summarised below.
Risk assessment of glyphosate resistant fodder
beet
The risk assessment was done in connection with
an application concerning the placing on the of a
fodder beet tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate
(notification C/DK/97/01). An evaluation was car-
ried out by the competent Danish authority. Also,
the Scientific Committee on Plants in the EU was
asked its opinion on whether the genetically mod-
ified fodder beet is likely to have adverse effects on
human health and the environment.
The risk assessment was carried out according
to Directive 90/220/EEC. The directive states that
the risk assessment should consider whether the
use of the genetically modified fodder beet gives
rise to adverse effects on human health and the
environment. The use of the herbicide glyphosate
as such is not covered by the risk assessment (but
has to be evaluated on its own, according to Direc-
tive 91/414/EEC).
The risk assessment does not explicitly set out
the criteria considered relevant. However, in con-
nection with adverse effects on human health, the
following adverse effects are considered: toxic
effects of the produced enzyme, allergenic effects
due to the genetic modification and health risks
from using the beet to food production due to the
genetic modification. On the basis of experiments
on a soy bean modified with the same gene, and on
the absence of any reason to believe conditions to
be different for the fodder beet, it is concluded that
the fodder beet does not give rise to health pro-
blems.
Concerning adverse effects on the environ-
ment, the following can be noted: establishment
and subsequent invasion of the modified fodder
beet outside cultivated areas and ecological conse-
quences of hybridisation with the wild relative Beta
maritime. In a number of experiments, no signifi-
cant difference to the unmodified fodder beet in
terms of competitiveness has been observed, so it
is concluded that no ecological effects are to be
expected from establishment outside cultivated
areas. Furthermore, since glyphosate is not used
on or near seashores, there are no ecological con-
sequences to be expected from spread of the gene
to Beta maritime.
Finally, the adverse effect of spread of the resis-
tance gene to weed beet is evaluated. One possible
adverse effect was mentioned during the exercise
by the experts as not examined: adverse effects on
biogeochemical cycles.
When it comes to uncertainty, it is clear that the
experimental evidence is somewhat limited in
time horizon: there is no experience of the long
term effects of growth or foddering. It is possible to
set up alternative scenarios concerning, e.g., inva-
sion of the fodder beet outside cultivated areas.
The risk assessment is concerned with the neces-
sary conditions for this scenario to occur. The
improbability of the scenario is based on the
absence of evidence of any competitive advantage.
Similarly, exclusion of scenarios with ecological
consequences of gene-spread to Beta maritime is
based on the improbability that glyphosate would
be used on or near seashore areas.
Thus, even though the experimental evidence
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is somewhat limited and alternative scenarios can
be envisaged, the fodder beet is able to remind us
that uncertainties should not be overstated.
Risk assessment of penta-bromo diphenyl ether
This risk assessment was carried out in accordan-
ce with Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 on the
evaluation and control of “existing” substances.
“Existing” substances are chemical substances in
the use within the European Community before
September 1981 and listed in the European
Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical
Substances. Regulation 793/93 provides a syste-
matic framework for the evaluation of risks to
human health and the environment presented by
these substances if they are produced or imported
into the Community in volumes above 10 tonnes
per year.
The methods for carrying out an in-depth risk
assessment at Community level are laid down in
Commission Regulation (EC) 1488/94, which is
supported by a technical guidance document.
All identified risks are associated with the
manufacture and use of penta-BDPE in polyuret-
hane products. However, it cannot be excluded
that there may be uses of the substance not cove-
red by the risk assessment.
Roughly, the risk assessment should, within
each area considered, conclude in one out of these
three ways: (i) There is a need for further informa-
tion and/or testing; (ii) There is at present no need
for further information and/or testing or for risk
reduction measures beyond those which are being
applied already; or (iii) There is a need to limit the
risks.
Concerning the environment, the risk assess-
ment estimates ‘predicted no effect concentra-
tions’ (PNECs) for aquatic and terrestrial compart-
ments. These are then compared with ‘predicted
environmental concentrations’ (PECs). Also,
secondary poisoning in the food chain is conside-
red. A PEC/PNEC ratio greater than one gives
reason for concern. Finally, abiotic effects in the
atmosphere are considered.
Risks to the atmosphere and those arising from
regional emissions to the aquatic environment (in
both surface waters and sediments) have been
found to be acceptable. As for secondary poiso-
ning, a need for risk reduction measures has been
identified: PEC/PNEC for the fish-based food
chain is estimated at 2.2; and PEC/PNEC for the
earthworm, based on the food chain, is estimated
at 1.7.
Concerning human health, a number of adver-
se effects are considered: acute toxicity, irritation
of the skin, eyes and respiratory tract, corrosivity,
sensitisation of eyes and respiratory tract, mutage-
nicity, carcinogenicity and toxicity vis-à-vis repro-
duction. Exposure is assessed for workers and con-
sumers; indirect exposure via the environment is
also assessed, as is combined exposure and expo-
sure to infants via milk.
There are no data on the toxicological effects of
penta-BDPE in humans. Also, exposure assess-
ments are rather uncertain. The risk assessment
concludes that consumer exposure is negligible,
whereas there is a need for further information
and/or testing concerning the other forms of
exposure. 
In this case, there are uncertainties at many
levels. Particularly concerning human health, the-
re is no certain hazard identification and conside-
rable limitations in the possibilities of obtaining
results from humans. Also, exposure assessments
are difficult to make. For a substance like this, the
proposal for a new decision procedure, based on
the Precautionary Principle, concerning substan-
ces which are persistent, bio accumulating and
toxic, might involve clearer criteria for decision
makers.
Risk assessment of vanadium
In 2002, the European Parliament and the Council
adopted Directive 2002/46/EC on food supple-
ments containing vitamins and minerals. In addi-
tion, the Scientific Committee on Food (SCF) issu-
ed, from October 2000 to April 2003, a series of
opinions on tolerable upper intake levels of indivi-
dual vitamins and minerals and safety factors in
relation to their use in fortified foods and food
supplements. The SCF opinions covered 22 out of
the 29 nutrients which were considered to be wit-
hin their mandate for this task. Therefore, the
European Food Safety Authority was asked to pro-
vide similar scientific opinions on the remaining 7
vitamins and minerals, plus an additional 5 (inclu-
ding vanadium).
The hazard identification is limited to oral tox-
icity data (except for carcinogenicity). Hazards
from inhalation and the medical occupation have
been reviewed in other contexts. The following
adverse effects are considered: acute toxicity, sub-
acute/subchronic toxicity, carcinogenicity, gen-
otoxicity, reproductive and developmental toxicity. 
In humans, gastrointestinal difficulties caused
by doses as low as 0.2 mg/kg body weight/day have
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been reported. In rats, vanadium compounds
affect kidneys and other organs at relatively low
doses, and at higher doses they have adverse
effects reproduction and the development of the
offspring of rats and mice. These effects have not
been demonstrated in humans, but there is no evi-
dence that they cannot occur.
The mean dietary intake of vanadium is esti-
mated to be about 0.2-0.3 µg/kg bodyweight which
is at least three orders of magnitude below the
lowest dose reported to have adverse effects in rats
(800 µg/kg body weight) and in humans (200 µg/kg
body weight).
A ‘no observed adverse effect level’ (NOAEL)
cannot be derived from the available subacute and
subchronic studies on rats, nor can it be derived
from developmental toxicity studies on rats. Hen-
ce, the available data are insufficient to show the
highest level of oral intake that can be regarded as
tolerable. There is uncertainty about the critical
levels as well as about exposure.
There is concern about athletes and body buil-
ders who use vanadium in supplements, although
the effects of this have not been documented in
humans. For these groups, the daily intake may be
similar to the doses reported to cause gastrointes-
tinal effects in humans and kidney lesions in rats.
The fact that there is no documented positive
effect of vanadium might be relevant in risk mana-
gement decisions. The absence of benefits might
justify a stricter regulation than would be suitable
in cases where, because of the expected benefits, it
is considered acceptable to run some risk.
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The project was carried out within the framework
of the Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk
Assessment, a cooperation platform of four uni-
versities and research institutions in Denmark.
Methodologically, the project presents reflections
on how to increase transparency of decision-
making. The basis of these reflections is studies of
relevant literature and interviews with key persons
within the area. The reflections draw on concepts
and theories from many disciplines, e.g. risk
assessment, systems thinking, decision theory, sci-
ence sociology, engineering and philosophy. They
of course also draw on our professional experien-
ce, see below.
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The Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment (CeBRA) performs interdisciplinary research on
ethics, risk issues and other societal aspects regarding the performance and results of biological sciences.
Researchers with their background in social sciences and the humanities as well as in natural and applied
sciences are involved in CeBRA’s projects. CeBRA is jointly owned by the Danish Institute of Agricultural
Sciences, Risoe National Laboratory, the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University and the University
of Copenhagen. Its project grants come mostly from Danish and European public funds and some also
from industry.
In 2001 the Danish Parliament launched the BioTIK project. It was a four-year project focusing on both
the possibilities that gene technology offers, and the ethical principles that are to be considered in order
to make the right decisions. BioTIK is a Danish abbreviation of biotechnology and ethics. Hence nine
Danish ministries joined a Task Force with the purpose to incorporate ethical principles in regulation of
biotechnology, in decision making processes and as a basis for public debate and information.
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